TUE AM: Dr. Whidby on PM’s Harm Reduction Filter Technologies
February 22, 2005 1:28 pm by Gene BorioLong-term Philip Morris R&D scientist Jerry Frank Whidby testified today about attempts at Philip Morris to reduce the harms of cigarettes. In his Written Direct Testimony, Dr. Whidby states,
My co-workers and I were working to make cigarettes less hazardous. While I cannot speak to the beliefs of all the workers in the Research & Development Department during the 26 years of my employment, I and many others believed cigarette smoking is dangerous and can cause disease.
DOJ lawyer Jim Nelson questioned Dr. Whidby about whether Philip Morris cigarette design efforts resulted in a) lowered biological activity, b) lower actual yields of tar deliveries to the smoker or c) any reduction at all in lung cancer rates.
Dr. Whidby’s WDT contain several Q&As like this:
Q: Do you have any evidence that the general reduction and selective reduction techniques Philip Morris has employed in its cigarettes have led to one fewer case of lung cancer in the United States? 5
A: [Dr. Whidby’s corrected answer] I am aware that it has been reported over the past several years that there has been a decline in lung cancer rates. While I believe that Philip Morris’ general and selective reduction efforts may have contributed to that decline, it is beyond my expertise to evaluate those reported findings or their cause.
Mr. Nelson’s examination consisted of a) pinning Dr. Whidby down that no matter his beliefs, he did not have empirical evidence, and b) presenting him with scientific studies, like Monograph 13, that came to conclusions opposite to his beliefs.
Courtroom Missteps
Philip Morris attorney Pat Schwarzschild (Hunton & Williams) seemed to get off on the wrong foot with Judge Kessler with her early objections, and was even rebuked for lodging an objection (”I don’t know what that statement means”) that was really the province of the witness. It didn’t help that Dr. Whidby, who at times seemed visibly nervous, repeated the objection virtually word-for-word. Judge Kessler said, “Ms. Schwarzschild, do not do that again.”
The whole court seemed almost under water off this morning. The microphones weren’t working, and the witness and attorneys seemed to be speaking sotto voce. At one point Judge Kessler said, like a stage director trying to enliven her cast, “I know we had a 3 day holiday….but everybody is muttering. . . Everybody needs to speak up and get a little more energy into their speaking!”
Visible Ventilation Holes?
Judge Kessler was definitely not asleep. When Ms. Schwarzschild presented a defense demonstrative of filter technology, one of the illustrations was of filter length, and showed 2 white filters of different length side-by-side. Judge Kessler pointed out that the ventilation filter holes were plainly visible in both illustrations. “That’s misleading, no?” she asked. “The ordinary smoker can’t see the ventilation holes?”
She mentally chewed on this idea over the next few minutes for at one point she asked Dr. Whidby, “Is there any technical or scientific reason why ventilation holes couldn’t be clearly identified for smokers so they wouldn’t block them?”
Dr. Whidby said, no.
Judge Kessler asked, “So why didn’t you identify the ventilation holes for people?”
Dr. Whidby went off to a side issue about how the holes were visible in the early perforation methods, but that with the laser technology in use since the late 70s-early 80s, “we didn’t mark them because consumers complained they didn’t want to see holes in the filters.”
Kessler Developing Tobacco-Funding Radar
Judge Kessler seems to have attained some sort of personal radar on the presentation of evidence.
When Ms. Schwarzschild presented a 1995 article by Deitrich Hoffman, “Changes in Cigarette Design and Composition over Time and How they Influence the Yields of Smoke Constituents,” Judge Kessler asked if Dr. Hoffmann were a Philip Morris employee. “No,” said Dr. Whidby, “he works in a lab in New York.”
Then she asked if he were a consultant to Philip Morris, or to the industry? Dr. Whidby said “Not to my knowledge.”
Then she asked, “What is this quote - unquote independent lab he works for?”
Dr. Whidby responded, “I believe it’s called the American Health Foundation.”
I’m pretty sure I saw a wry smile on her face as she immediately turned back to Ms. Schwarzschild and said, “Go ahead.”
February 22nd, 2005 at 9:38 pm
Gene, the pretended world-weariness isn’t necessary here.
The American Health Foundation has a somewhat checkered history, but for purposes of this blog it was a politicized, but largely legitimate research foundation associated with the New York Medical College. . .one that was virulently and overtly anti-tobacco for decades. . .until they overfed at the public trough, overdrawing their cushy Federal Grant money, and abruptly went bankrupt, leaving we-the-taxpayer to foot the bill.
No matter. These are more irrelevancies from the gov’t as their case dies on the vine and they continue to grasp at straws.
Who cares what Dr. Whidby believes about smoking and disease. . .how do those beliefs constitute RICO violations?
Likewise, whether or not his putatively reduced harm products can be proven to be effective is irrelevant also. Last time I checked *NOT* being able to prove reduced lung cancer rates isn’t racketeering. Neither is showing that there are scientific documents that contradict him. Maybe Philip Morris *hasn’t* made cigarettes safer in the last 30 years. So what? Since when is that a Federal crime?
The real news today is Tobacco’s rebuttal brief on remedies, post the DC circuit decision. That disciplined response is going to take all the wind out of the DOJ’s sails. Even if the gov’t can establish proof of ongoing or likely future RICO violations (which they haven’t been doing a very good job of so far), pretty soon they are going to find themselves unable to actually do anything about any of it because virtually all of the non-disgorgement remedies they have asked for, (smoking cessation programs, more research, etc), are now legally completely unavailable to them.
This case *IS* over now, for practical purposes.
February 23rd, 2005 at 12:29 pm
Hey, how about some reduced death SARS? Want that? At Philip Morris our scientists are busy at work bringing it to market. All the SARS, only half the bodies.
And reduced crippling polio, how about that? Now with reduced maiming! Well, maybe with just as much maiming, we can’t be sure. Great stuff!
But wait, there’s more: reduced brain damage mad cow disease. At Philip Morris, we’re working on it. We just want to help out. Because that’s just how nice we are.
What’s that? You don’t want reduced death SARS? You want less SARS? You want less polio? Less disease?
But, but, at Philip Morris we make money spreading disease.
And that, in a nutshell, is why Philip Morris will never talk about the most effective, least effective tobacco harm reduction known: reducing consumption.
Instead, Philip Morris will push the most expensive, least effective way known: tinkering with product. And will paint itself as our big friend for doing so. Because that way makes the most money for Philip Morris.
If Philip Morris really wanted harm reduction, it could do so immediately. No tinkering needed, no research needed. We already know how to reduce consumption: stop pushing up consumption. Stop promoting tobacco. Stop making it appealing to 12 year olds. Stop spending $14 billion a year painting it as sexy, glamorous, fun, a sign of independence. Stop engineering it for addiction. Stop fighting smokefree policies that help smokers quit.
If the tobacco industry really wanted harm reduction, it could do this tomorrow.
Instead the tobacco industry once again puts its profits above public health, and pushes reduced carnage product. And puts on that it should be thanked for doing so and viewed as part of the solution.
The solution is not reduced crippling polio. It’s less polio.
February 24th, 2005 at 11:50 pm
Liggett developed a cigarette by 1979 that caused 80-100% fewer tumors in the same type of mouse-painting experiments that Wynder used (the Project XA, or palladium nitrate catalyst cigarette). They did long-term inhalation experiments to check the effects of the palladium and found no significant changes. The only reasons Liggett did not incorporate this potentially life-saving technology into their existing brands was because 1)they could find no way to publicize it legally, and 2) they feared increased liabilty for their other products, which might then be considered unsafe. The fact that the cigarette had the potential to save lives took a back seat to the profit motive.
February 27th, 2005 at 10:49 pm
With respect, Anne, I submit that Liggett put profit before lives when it made the choice to develop the new cigarette. We already knew how to reduce tobacco death; we had a proven approach: reduce consumption. Instead Liggest chose an unproven approach that favored its profits.
This has always been the problem with “harm reduction” initiated by the industry. Its incentive is always to sell product. Fundamentally that conflicts with the most effective harm reduction approach known: reduce consumption.
However as it turned out, the industry made a great deal worse choice than that. It sold the illusion of harm reduction: filters, lite product, both of which it knew were ineffective or even counterproductive. It marketed a false reassurance of safety.