EXPERT REPORT OF MAX H. BAZERMAN, Ph.D.

March 21, 2005 11:57 pm by Gene Borio

EXCERPT

Simply put, as long as executives and managers are rewarded for increasing market share and for increasing profit, while not being rewarded for stopping misconduct, accepted theories of behavioral decision research lead to the conclusion that the same conduct of the executives and managers of the defendants alleged to be wrongful will continue.

32. My goal is to highlight potential strategies that likely would eliminate the misconduct the United States has proven. It is up to the Court to decide which of these in combination will achieve the objective of preventing and restraining future misconduct. There are various structural changes that would affect the incentives operating on defendants’ managers and the systematic bias that defendants’ managers experience including, but not limited to: (a) eliminating economic incentives for defendants to sell cigarettes to young people; (b) changing compensation and promotion policies for managers and executives to produce outcomes inconsistent with misconduct; (c) removal of senior management; (d) requiring subcontracting of all research to private companies monitored by the Court; and (e) requiring the defendants to sell (in tact) their research and development, current product development activities, and all other relevant material regarding safer cigarettes so that safer cigarettes can be brought to the marketplace.

33. In addition, the measures above could be supported by additional efforts that focus on (a) educating managers in such a way to address bias in decision-making; and (b) creating internal mechanisms for employees to report misconduct without fear of retribution; (c) changing oversight and reporting arrangements, (d) requiring the disclosure of any information concerning an actual or potential health or safety risk with which a consumer of cigarettes would be concerned; (e) requiring the discontinuance of or change to advertising and promotional campaigns or practices; (f) severe monetary fines for participation in or association with individuals or organizations engaged in activities that constitute or will reasonably result in corporate or individual misconduct; and (g) requiring defendants to fund certain activities, such as cessation programs and counter-marketing programs, that affect consumer demand for their products.

34. I recommend that choices among these changes be implemented within a structure that utilizes court-appointed monitors who will have the authority, with the utilization of outside experts as needed, to review all aspects of defendants’ businesses, including contracts and other transactions.

Text of PDF file of Brazerman Filing follows:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.,

f/k/a PHILIP MORRIS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. v. : 99-2496 (GK)

Next scheduled appearance: Trial (ongoing)

UNITED STATES EXPERT DISCLOSURE FOR MAX H BAZERMAN Ph.D.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), Order #886 and Order #898, the United States respectfully submits the following disclosure, including a report of the expert opinions presently intended to be expressed at trial by Max H. Bazerman, Ph.D. Dr. Bazerman’s opinions are based on his education, training, and professional experience, as detailed in the attached curriculum vitae, as well as related literature in his field. All of Dr. Bazerman’s publications from the last ten years are set out in his curriculum vitae. Dr. Bazerman endeavors to keep himself informed of new developments in his field through a review of the published literature and working papers, and will continue to do so after this expert report is filed.

Accompanying his report is a list of the publications and other data or information that Dr. Bazerman has relied on in forming the opinions that he has expressed in his report. Dr. Bazerman may subsequently review additional data and information, and may supplement his reliance material as necessary. Accordingly, he may offer additional opinions, or additional reasons for his opinions, as a result of his ongoing professional review of data and information relevant to his field or in response to issues that may be raised by the defendants in this case. The United States reserves the right to supplement this disclosure to provide additional areas of testimony, additional opinions, and additional grounds for opinions based on continuing discovery and/or any additional research, study or publication. Supplementation may take the form of amendments to this disclosure, a further disclosure, deposition testimony or any other form sufficient to apprise defendants of additional areas of testimony, additional opinions and additional grounds for opinions.

Dr. Bazerman was compensated at the rate of $800 per hour in connection with the preparation of this report. Any testimony given by him in this case will be compensated at the same rate. Respectfully submitted,

PETER D. KEISLER

Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Sharon Y Eubanks

SHARON Y. EUBANKS (DC Bar # 420147)

Director, Tobacco Litigation Team

/s/ Stephen D Brody

STEPHEN D. BRODY (DC Bar # 459263)

Deputy Director, Tobacco Litigation Team

RENÉE BROOKER (D.C. Bar #430159)

Assistant Director, Tobacco Litigation Team

LEO JOSEPH WISE

ALLISON CENDALI

Trial Attorneys, Tobacco Litigation Team

United States Department of Justice

Post Office Box 14524, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044-4524

(202) 616-4185

Attorneys for Plaintiff

March 21, 2005 United States of America

EXPERT REPORT OF MAX H. BAZERMAN, Ph.D.

QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is Max H. Bazerman. I am the Jesse Isador Straus Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School. My curriculum vitae is attached to this report.

2. My research focuses on decision making, negotiation, and the psychology of unethical behavior. I am the author or co-author of over 150 research and managerial articles (over 80 of which have appeared in peer-reviewed journals), the author or co-author of six books, and editor or co-editor of nine other books. My books include Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (2006, Wiley, currently in its sixth edition), Predictable Surprises (2004, Harvard Business School Press, with Michael Watkins) and “You Can’t Enlarge the Pie Six Barriers to Effective Government (2001, Basic Books, with Jonathan Baron and Katie Shonk). I serve on the editorial boards of the American Behavioral Scientist Journal of Applied Psychology the Academy of Management Review the Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Organizational Behavioral and Human Decision Processes and the Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets.

3. My specific expertise is in the area of behavioral decision research in managerial/organizational contexts. I believe that my book, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making is the most widely read and cited integration of the behavioral decision research area in a managerial/organizational context. I have been the keynote speaker at a number of professional meetings and have

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presented my research on decision making at universities including Stanford, University of Chicago, Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, Cornell, Wharton, Northwestern, MIT, Ben Gurion University, Notre Dame, Rice, Minnesota, Yale, UCLA, Ohio State, Princeton, London Business School, University of Tilburg, Dartmouth, Colorado, Virginia, MIT, Boston College, NYU, Columbia, Duke, Tulane, Pittsburgh, and Toronto.

4. I have consulted and taught for numerous corporations, institutions and professional associations, including Abbott, Aetna, Alcar, Alcoa, Allstate, Ameritech, Amgen, Asian Development Bank, AstraZeneca, AT&T, Aventis, BASF, Bayer, Becton Dickenson, Boston Scientific, Bristol-Myers Squibb, British Petroleum, Business Week, Celtic Insurance, Chevron, Chicago Tribune, City of Chicago, Deloitte and Touche, Dial, Ernst and Young, First Chicago, Gemini Consulting, General Motors, Harris Bank, Home Depot, Hyatt Hotels, IBM, John Hancock, Johnson and Johnson, Kohler, KPMG, Lehman Brothers, Lucent, The May Company, McKinsey, Merrill Lynch, Monitor, Motorola, National Association of Broadcasters, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, R. P. Scherer, Sara Lee, Siemens, Sprint, Sulzermedica, The Nature Conservancy, Unicredito, Union Bank of Switzerland, Wilson Sporting Goods, Xerox, Young Presidents Organization, World Bank and Zurich Insurance.

5. I have been a fellow of the American Psychological Association (1987-1993), the American Psychological Society (1988-present), the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1989-1990), and the Academy of Management (2001-

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present). I have won awards for research design, teaching, and the mentoring of graduate students.

6. In recent years, I have focused my research and publications on the critical role that psychological bias plays in driving unethical behavior in organizations. My research on this topic was first published in a paper with David Messick. I updated my work in a recent article with Mahzarin Banaji and Dolly Chugh, and have applied it to the recent public debate about auditor independence. I have created an executive program with Mahzarin Banaji, based on the principles in this work, for the managing directors of Lehman Brothers. I am also currently working with British Petroleum on a set of executive programs that includes work on these principles.

7. I charge $800.00 per hour for my work as an expert in this case.

8. I have testified on one other occasion in the last four years in a case before the Federal Trade Commission entitled In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corporation Upsher-Smith Laboratories and American Home Products Corporation Docket No. 9297 (Final Order December 18, 2003).

OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT

9. The United States has asked me (a) to outline theory from the field of behavioral decision research relevant to potential remedies in this case, (b) to discuss applications of this theory to business contexts and (c) to apply those theories to this case.

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

10. The United States has instructed me to assume that it has established defendants’ liability and that at least some of defendants’ misconduct continues to this day. Making those assumptions, and applying theory from behavioral decision research as it relates to issues of incentive and bias, I conclude that defendants’ misconduct will continue absent significant structural changes to the defendants’ businesses.

11. Many managers and executives at defendants’ companies will make decisions affected by the incentives for sales and profits that dominate most firms. In addition, even if managers and executives at defendants’ companies want to fulfill their stated objectives regarding a number of other behaviors, as long as incentives primarily reward profit and sales, managers and executives will be incapable of making unbiased judgments, and these biases will operate in the systematic direction of their incentives - even for the most honest of managers and executives.

12. As a result managers and executives within the defendant firms will likely act consistently with these incentives and biases.

13. There are various structural changes that would affect the incentives operating on the intentional and unintentional behavior of the defendants’ managers and executives.

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BEHAVIORAL DECISION RESEARCH

14. In his Nobel Prize-winning work (the Nobel Prize in economics), Herbert Simon (1957; March and Simon, 1958) argued that individual judgment is bounded in its rationality. The core idea was to challenge the common assumption of rationality that is so central to the economics profession. While the bounded rationality framework views individuals as attempting to make rational decisions, it acknowledges that decision makers often lack the information and cognitive skill to act in a fully rational manner. Fifteen years after the publication of Simon’s work, Tversky and Kahneman (1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) produced their own Nobel Prize (in economics) winning work that provided critical information about specific systematic biases that influence judgment (Kahneman received the prize after Tversky’s death for this work). These two Nobel prizes signaled the broad acceptance of the field of behavioral decision research in economics, and more broadly, as a mature area of intellectual study. Theft work, and work that followed, led to our modem understanding of judginent.

15. The core (but not only) method of behavioral decision research has been the use of tightly controlled, laboratory experiments. This methodology has dominated the field both to allow irrefutable causal inferences and to identify how certain variables affect decision making. The ideas from behavioral decision research have proven robust with a variety of different subject populations, across cultures, and across a variety of professional contexts. The vast majority of the published empirical research in behavioral decision research has appeared in peer-reviewed journals.

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16. In addition to the Nobel Prize winning work of Simon and of Tversky and Kahneman, there are many other very visible researchers in this area: Paul Slovic (Decision Research), Baruch Fischhoff (CMU), George Loewenstein (CMU), Mahzarin Banaji (Harvard), Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard), David Laibson (Harvard), Mall Rabin (Berkeley), Eldar Shafir (Princeton), Cohn Camerer (Cal Tech), Richard Thaler (University of Chicago), Cass Sunstein (University of Chicago), and others. Behavioral decision research is a well-established field, with economics, finance, psychology, and professional school faculty currently engaged in this area of research. Variations of behavioral decision research have developed as behavioral economics, behavioral finance, decision research in marketing, legal decision making, a decision perspective to negotiations, medical decision making, and other fields of study. The core idea that research can identify systematic errors in decision making is now broadly accepted as an important and rigorous area of scientific inquiry.

17. Recently, Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005) introduced the concept of bounded ethicality to refer to the notion that our ethics are limited in ways we are not even aware of ourselves. That is, we summarize evidence that humans engage in a variety of unethical behavior without their own awareness, and that is inconsistent with their own explicitly stated preferences. One clear result of this research is that people engage in self-serving behavior that exceeds the degree to which they are consciously aware (Banaji, Bazerman, and Chugh, 2003).

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18. My colleagues and I published research as early as 1996 (Mesick, and Bazerman, 1996; Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997) that bias enters unconsciously and unintentionally in making judgments. Individuals have a tendency to assess what is rewarded, and to make decisions based on these incentives, and to justify this behavior by cognitively adjusting their understanding of the situation in ways that allow them to make decisions in the direction of their incentives (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).

BEHAVIORAL DECISION RESEARCH APPLIED TO BUSINESSES AND FIRMS

19. Across a number of contexts, my co-authors and I have shown that individuals make distorted judgments in self-serving ways. Part of the distortion is due to intentional corruption. But, a more common distortion occurs from the unintentional bias that occurs from partisan preference. Partisan preference refers to the bias in bow people see information based on which role they hold in a specific context. Thus, sellers typically think that their house is worth more than buyers typically think that it is worth. Similarly, plaintiffs typically see a case being “worth more” than defendants (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Across a number of contexts, research (including my own) shows that individuals make distorted judgments in self-serving ways.

20. In my writings as early as 1997, and during my testimony to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) in 2000, I established that when parties are motivated to see information in a particular manner, even honest employees often will be incapable of unbiased and uncorrupted judgment. My co-

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authored work concluded that there were three clear ways to restructure the auditing industry so that incentives that create corruption and bias will not occur in the future: (a) auditing firms should only audit and should provide no other services; (b) auditing firms should be hired for fixed-term, non-renewable contracts that cannot be terminated by the client; (c) employees from audit firms should not be allowed to accept positions with their clients for an extended period of time.

21. Essentially, we concluded that the desires to sell other services, to maintain the client in the future, and to obtain lucrative jobs with the client destroy the objectivity of the audit. Our appearance before the S.E.C. in 2000 predated the fraud and accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adeiphia, and a host of other firms.

BEHAVIORAL DECISION RESEARCH APPLIED TO THIS CASE

22. Understanding how incentives affect the conduct of business organizations is critical to understanding the current and future behavior of the defendants in this case. Incentives affect behavior both through changes in the intentional actions of managers and executives, and through implicit processes.

23. Extensive research evidence exists to conclude that the incentives operating in organizations will affect the intentional actions of executives and managers.

24. As to the role of systematic bias, extensive psychological research shows that an individual’s preferences affect the way that he or she interprets information, even when he or she is trying to be objective and impartial. Without knowing it, individuals tend to scrutinize critically and then discount facts that contradict

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conclusions they want to reach, and embrace evidence that supports those conclusions (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Unaware of this skewed information processing, individuals erroneously conclude that their judgments are free of bias (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, and Bazerman, 1997; Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997).

25. Many biases affect judgment, and I present an overview of these biases in my book Judgment in Managerial Decision Making Beyond the self-serving bias discussed above, these biases include, but are not limited to, escalation, the confirmation trap, and the statistical victim effect (Bazerman, 2006; Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997).

26. Escalation refers to the tendency to continue commitment in order to justify a prior commitment to a course of action, beyond the degree to which it is rational to continue that course of action (Bazerman, 2006). A logical inference of this research is that, for example, when defendants make statements regarding the lack of evidence of causal connections between theft products and various diseases in individuals who smoke, they continue to escalation action to these positions even when further evidence develops that is inconsistent with these earlier statements.

27. The confirmation trap refers to the tendency to seek information that confirms what you believe to be true or what you want to be true, rather than rationally entertaining disconfirming information (Bazerman, 2006). A logical inference is that the defendants seek information that confirms their previously stated views, and will under weigh or ignore disconfirming evidence.

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28. The statistical victim effect refers to the tendency to underweigh the harm created to future victims of a course of action when those victims are “statistical” - the victims cannot be identified at the time the decision is made. People tend to be far more willing to impose harm on statistical victims than on known victims (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). A logical inference of this work is that the defendants underweigh the harms caused by smoking, because the future victims are “statistics” rather than identifiable victims.

29. As stated in the above summary of conclusions, the United States has instructed me to assume that it has established defendants’ liability and that at least some of defendants’ misconduct continues to this day. Making those assumptions and applying theory from behavioral decision research as it relates to issues of incentive and bias, I conclude that defendants’ conduct will continue to be consistent with its current profit seeking incentives and systematic biases. In what follows, I am addressing both the questions of (1) the need for structural changes needed given the operation of incentives and systematic bias on the managers and executives in defendants’ businesses and (2) the kinds of changes that will address these incentives and biases.

30. In addressing these questions, I have read the written direct examinations and trial testimony in this case of senior managers at the defendants’ companies including Martin Orlowsky, Susan Ivey, Andrew Schindler, Bennett LeBow, Steven Parrish, Denise Keane, and the designated prior testimony of Michael Szymanczyk. In addition, I have reviewed the testimony, transcripts, documents and legal

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documents listed in the appendix to this report. I also intend to review additional evidence as it comes to light at trial.

31. It is my understanding that defendants have offered testimony and argument that theft behavior has changed from their past and will be different in the future. However, my overall conclusion is that there exists substantial evidence that when managers and executives have the incentive to act in a particular direction they will be incapable of making unbiased judgments, and that these biases will operate in the systematic direction of their incentives - even for the most honest of managers and executives. Simply put, as long as executives and managers are rewarded for increasing market share and for increasing profit, while not being rewarded for stopping misconduct, accepted theories of behavioral decision research lead to the conclusion that the same conduct of the executives and managers of the defendants alleged to be wrongful will continue.

32. My goal is to highlight potential strategies that likely would eliminate the misconduct the United States has proven. It is up to the Court to decide which of these in combination will achieve the objective of preventing and restraining future misconduct. There are various structural changes that would affect the incentives operating on defendants’ managers and the systematic bias that defendants’ managers experience including, but not limited to: (a) eliminating economic incentives for defendants to sell cigarettes to young people; (b) changing compensation and promotion policies for managers and executives to produce outcomes inconsistent with misconduct; (c) removal of senior management; (d) requiring subcontracting of all research to private companies monitored by the

12

Court; and (e) requiring the defendants to sell (in tact) their research and development, current product development activities, and all other relevant material regarding safer cigarettes so that safer cigarettes can be brought to the marketplace.

33. In addition, the measures above could be supported by additional efforts that focus on (a) educating managers in such a way to address bias in decision-making; and (b) creating internal mechanisms for employees to report misconduct without fear of retribution; (c) changing oversight and reporting arrangements, (d) requiring the disclosure of any information concerning an actual or potential health or safety risk with which a consumer of cigarettes would be concerned; (e) requiring the discontinuance of or change to advertising and promotional campaigns or practices; (f) severe monetary fines for participation in or association with individuals or organizations engaged in activities that constitute or will reasonably result in corporate or individual misconduct; and (g) requiring defendants to fund certain activities, such as cessation programs and counter-marketing programs, that affect consumer demand for their products.

34. I recommend that choices among these changes be implemented within a structure that utilizes court-appointed monitors who will have the authority, with the utilization of outside experts as needed, to review all aspects of defendants’ businesses, including contracts and other transactions.

MAR-21-2O3 13:42 FROM:FACULTY,NOM UNIT 617 4955672 TO:91202353O168 P:1/2

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Max H. Bazerman Ph.D.

Date: r

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 1 of 19

Max H. Bazerman Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration www.people.hbs.edu/mbazer… Office

Mellon D3-7, Harvard Business School

Harvard University - Soldiers Field Road Boston, MA 02163 (617) 495-6429 mbazerman@hbs.edu

DEGREES

2000: Harvard University, Masters of Arts (honorary).

1976-1979: The Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University. M.S.O.B. (1978), Ph.D. (1979).

1973-1976: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Bachelor of Sciences in Economics (1976). Majors: Organizational Psychology and Accounting.

EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE

2000-current: Harvard Business School, Harvard University. Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration. Affiliated appointments

Kennedy School of Government: Schedule C (voting) faculty member.

Psychology Department: Courtesy appointment.

Program on Negotiation: Executive Committee, Director - Psychological Processes in Negotiation, and Vice Chair for Research.

Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Steering Committee Harvard University Center on the Environment, Harvard Green Campus Initiative Advisory Committee, Harvard Sustainability Advisory Group: Member

1999-2000: Harvard Business School, Harvard University. Marvin Bower Fellow. Visiting Scholar, Program on Negotiation.

1985-2000: Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. Professor (courtesy) of the Department of Psychology. J.J. Gerber Distinguished Professor of Dispute Resolution and Organizations (1991current). J.L. Kellogg Distinguished Professor of Dispute Resolution and Organizations (1989-1991). J.L. Kellogg Associate Professor (1985-1986), Buchanan Family Associate Professor (1986-1987), Buchanan Family Professor of Organization Behavior (1987-1988). Chair- Northwestern University Provost Search Committee (1994). Coordinator of OB Doctoral Program and Admissions (1986-1988), and Coordinator of OB Doctoral Admissions (1990-1997). Executive Committee (1986-current), acting co-director (7/1/87-12/31/87), and acting director (7/1/90-12/31/90) of the Dispute Resolution Research Center. Director, Kellogg Environmental Research Center (9/1/1994-2000), Personnel Committee (1987-1989).

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 2 of 19

1998: Harvard Business School, Harvard University. Thomas Horny Carroll Ford Visiting Professor of Business Administration. Visiting Scholar, Program on Negotiation.

1989-1990: Center for Advanced Study in the Behavior Sciences, Fellow.

1986: Graduate Institute of Business Administration, Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok, Thailand). Visiting Associate Professor (February-March, November-December).

1983-1985: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Assistant Professor. Coordinator of Master’s Concentration in Human Resource Management.

1981-1983: Department of Organizational Behavior, School of Management, Boston University. Assistant Professor. Faculty Policy Committee (Vice-Chair) and Doctoral Program Committee.

1979-1980: Department of Management, Graduate School of Business Administration, The University of Texas at Austin, Assistant Professor.

1977-1979: The Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University. Instructor.

AUTHORED BOOKS

Bazerman, M.H. Judgment in Managerial Decision Making John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005/6th Edition. Published in Polish, Russian, Japanese, and Portuguese - Chapter 2 of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been reprinted in B.M. Staw (Ed.), Psychological Dimensions of Organizational Behavior MacMillan, 1991 (1st edition), Prentice Hall, 1995 (2nd edition).

Chapter 2 of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been summarized in the Harvard Management Update, April, 1998.

Chapter? of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been reprinted in S.C. Currall, D. Geddes, SM. Schmidt, & A. Hichner (Eds.), Power and Negotiation in Organizations Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1995.

Bazerman, M.H., & Watkins, M. Predictable Surprises Harvard Business School Press, 2004.

Bazerman, M.H., Baron, 1., & Shonk, K. You Can’t Enlarge the Pie Six Barriers to Effective Government Basic Books, 2001.

Bazerman, M.H. Smart Money Decisions John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999. Recognized as one of the 10 best personal finance and investing books of the year by Arnazon.com. Recognized as one of the 30 best business of the year by Soundview Executive Book Summaries. Published in Spanish. The following adaptations have also been published

Bazerman, M.H. Smart Money Decisions. Soundview Executive Book Summaries Volume 21, Number 12, 1999.

Bazerman, MR. Ten Money Mistakes. Personal Excellence 1999, November.

Bazerman, M.H. Knowing When to Quit. Personal Excellence 2000, June.

Bazerman, M.H. Money Mistakes. Personal Excellence 2000, September.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 3 of 19

Bazerman, M.H. Why You Do What You Do With Money and How to Change Bad Habits. Bottom Line 2001.

Bazerman, M.H. Judgment in Managerial Decision Making John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005/6th Edition. Published in Polish, Russian, Japanese, and Portuguese.

Chapter 2 of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been reprinted in B.M. Staw (Ed.), Psychological Dimensions of Organizational Behavior MacMillan, 1991 (1st edition), Prentice Hall, 1995 (2nd edition).

Chapter 2 of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been summarized in the Harvard Management Update, April, 1998. Chapter 7 of Judgment in Managerial Decision Making has been reprinted in S.C. Currall, D. Geddes, S.M. Schmidt, & A. Hichner (Eds.), Power and Negotiation inOrganizations, Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1995.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. Negotiating Rationally Free Press, 1992. Currently in l8 printing. Published in English, Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, and Chinese. The following are adaptations from this book

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, MA. Nonrational Escalation of Commitment in Negotiation. European Management Journal 1992,10,163-168.

Neale, M.A, & Bazerman, M.H. Negotiating Rationally: The Power and Impact of the Negotiator’s Frame. Academy of Management Executive 1992, 6, 42-51.

Reprinted in S.C. Currall, 0. (3eddes, S.M. Schmidt, & A. Hichner (Eds.), Power and Negotiation in Organizations Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1995.

Reprinted in R.J. Lewicki, J. Minton, & D.M. Saunders (Eds.), Negotiation Readings Exercises and Cases Irwin, 1997, 2001 (4th edition).

Reprinted in R.J. Lewicki (Ed.), Negotiation, McGraw-Hill 2002

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, MA. Negotiating Rationally. Business Week Executive Portfolio Volume 1, 1992.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. The Mythical Fixed-Pie. Executive Excellence, 1992,2. 14-15.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. Negotiating Rationally. Soundview Executive Book Summaries ii, March, 1992.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neal; MA. Negotiating Rationally. Small Business June, 1992.

Chapter 3 of Negotiating Rationally has been reprinted in B.M. Staw (Ed.), Psychological Dimensions of Organizational Behavior Prentice Hall, 1995.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neal; M.A. The Mythical Fixed-Pie. Personal Excellence 1997, October.

Neale, M.A., & Bazerman, M.H. Cognition and Rationality inNegotiation, Free Press, 1991.

EDITED BOOKS

Bazerman, M.H. (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making, and Resolution Volume 1 Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2005.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 4 of 19

Bazerman, M.H. (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Resolution Volume 2 Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2005.

Bazerman, M.H. (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Resolution Volume 3 Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2005.

Moore, D., Cain, D., Loewenstein, G., & Bazerman, M.H. Conflicts of Interest Problems and Solutions from Law Medicine and Organizational Settings. London: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., Messick, D.M., Tenbrunsel, A.E., & Wade-Benzoni, K.A. (Eds.), Environment Ethics and Behavior The Psychology of Environmental Valuation and Degradation SF: New Lexington Books, 1997.

Bazerman, M.H., Lewicki, R.J., & Sheppard, B.H. (Eds.), Handbook of Negotiation Research Volume III of Research in Negotiation in Organizations JAI Press, Inc., 1991.

Sheppard, B.H., Bazerman, M.H., & Lewicki, R.J. (Eds.), Research in Negotiation in Organizations A Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews JAI Press, Inc., Volume II, 1990.

Lewicki, R.J., Sheppard, B.H., & Bazerman, M.H. (Eds.), Research in Negotiation in Organizations A Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews JAI Press, Inc., Volume I, 1986.

Bazerman, M.H., & Lewicki, R.J. (Eds.), Negotiating in Organizations Sage Publications, Inc., 1983.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Bazerman, M.H. Conducting Influential Research: The Need for Prescriptive Implications. Academy of Management Review, 2005, 2, 25-31.

Idson, L.C., Chugh, D., Bereby-Meyer, Y., Moran, S., Grosskopf, B., & Bazerman, M.H. Overcoming Focusing Failures in Competitive Environments. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2004, fl,159-172.

Bazerman, M.H., & Banaji, M.R. The Social Psychology of Ordinary Unethical Behavior. Social Justice Research 2004,17,111-115.

Banaji, M.R., Bazerman, M.H., & Chugh, D. How (Un)ethical are you? Harvard Business Review December, 2003.

Tor, A., & Bazerman, M.H. Focusing Failures in Competitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors in the Moray Hall Game, the Acquiring a Company Game, and Multiparty Ultimatums. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2003, 1., 353-374.

Watkins, M. & Bazerman, M.H. Predictable Surprises. Harvard Business Review March 2003.

Reprinted in H. Balanoff (Ed.), Public Administration McGraw-Hill, 2004.

McGinn, K., Thompson, L.L., & Bazerman, M.H. Dyadic Processes of Disclosure and Reciprocity in Bargaining with Communication, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2003, j, 17-34.

Bazerman, M.H., Loewenstein, G, & Moore, D.A. Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits. Harvard Business Review November, 2002.

Reprinted in A. Leckey & J. Bogle (Eds.), _Best Business Stories of the Year Vintage Books, 2004.

O’Connor, K.M., deDreu, C.K.W., Sch.roth, H., Barry, B., Lituchy, 1., & Bazerman, M.H. What We Want to Do Versus What We Think We Should Do. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2002,15,403-418.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 5 of 19

Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Okumura, T., Brett, J.M., Moore, D.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., & Bazerman, M.H. Cognitions and Behavior in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas: A Comparison of Two Cultures. Journal of Applied Psychology 2002, 7, 87-95.

Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Hoffman, A.J., Thompson, L.L., Moore, D., Gillespie, J. & Bazerman, M.H. Contextualizing Environmental Negotiations: Uncovering Barriers to Efficient Agreements. Academy of Management Review 2002, 27.41-57.

Valley, K., Thompson, L.L., Gibbons, R., & Bazerman, M.H. How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games. Games and Economic Behavior 2002, a 127-155.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman, (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Makintand Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Hofitnan, A.J., Riley, H., Troast, J.G., & Bazerman, M.H. Overcoming Cognitive and Institutional Barriers to Cooperation, American Behavioral Scientist 2002,45, 820-845.

Bazerman, M.H. The Study of “Real” Decision Making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2001, .1.4. 353-355.

Bazerman, M.H. Consumer Research for Consumers. Journal of Consumer Research 2001, 27, 499-504.

Reprinted in F. Maidment (Ed.), Powerweb: Introduction to Business, McGraw-Hill, 2003.

Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Messick, D.M., & Bazerman, M.H. The Influence of Standards on Judgment and Choices, Academy of Management Journal 2000,41 854-866.

Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M.H. The Negotiation Matching Process: Relationships and Partner Selection, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1999, Q, 252-283.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., Moore, D., Tenbrunsel, A.E. & Wade-Benzoni, K.A. Explaining How Preferences Change Across Joint Versus Separate Evaluations, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 1999, 39, 41-58.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 1, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Medin, D.L., & Bazerman, M.H. Broadening behavioral decision research: Multiple levels of processing, Psvchonomic Bulletin and Review, 1999, 6, 533-546.

Hsee, C.K., Loewenstein, G.F., Blount-Lyons, S. & Bazerman, M.H. Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Outcomes, Psychological Bulletin 1999,12_5 516-590.

Moore, D.A., Kurtzberg, T.R., Fox, C.R., & Bazerman, M.H. Positive Illusions and Biases of Prediction in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1999, 7, 95-114.

Reprinted in W. De Bondt (Ed.), The Psychology of World Equity Markets, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., & Gillespie, J.J. Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts. Harvard Business Review September-October, 1999.

Bazerman, M.H., Gillespie, J., & Moore, D. The Human Mind as a Barrier to Wiser Agreements. American Behavioral Scientist 1999,42,1277-1300.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 6 of 19

Hoffman, A., Gillespie, 3., Moore, D., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Thompson, L.L., & Bazerman, M.H. A Mixed-Motive Perspective on the Economics versus Environment Debate. American Behavioral Scientist 1999, 42. 1254-1276.

Bazerman, M.H., & Messick, D.M. On the Power of a Clear Definition of Rationality, Business Ethics Quarterly 1998, 8,477-480.

Reprinted in J. Dienhart, R. Duska, and D. Moberg (Eds.), The Next Phase of Business Ethics Integrating Psychology and Ethics JAI Press, 2001.

Bazerman, M.H., & Tenbrunsel, A.E. The Role of Social Context on Decisions: Integrating Social Cognition and Behavioral Decision Research. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 1998, 20, 87-91.

Valley, K.L., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M.H. A Matter of Trust: Effects of Communication on Efficiency and Distribution of Outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 1998, , 211-238.

Bazerman, M.H., Tenbrunsel, A.E. & Wade-Benzoni, K.A. Negotiating with Yourself and Losing: Understanding and Managing Conflicting Internal Preferences, Academy of Management Review 1998,23,225-241.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 1, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Gillespie, 3., & Bazerman, M.H. Pre-Settlement Settlement (PreSS): A Simple Technique for Initiating Complex Negotiation, Negotiation Journal 1998,14., 149-159.

Gillespie, 3., & Bazerman, M.H. Parasitic Integration, Negotiation Journal 1997, 13, 271-282.

Hoffinan, A.J., Bazerman, M.H., & Yaffe, S.L. The Endangered Species Act and the U.S. Economy. Sloan Management Review Fall, 1997, 59-73.

Bazerman, M.H., Morgan, K., & Loewenstein, G.F. The Impossibility of Auditor Independence. Sloan Management Review Summer, 1997.

Diekmann, K.A., Sarnuels, S.M., Ross, L., & Bazerman, M.H. Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1997, 7, 1061-1074.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Messick, D.M., Moore, D.A., & Bazerman, MR. Ultimatum Bargaining with a Committee: Underestimating the Importance of Decision Rule. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1997, 69, 87-101.

Blount, S., & Bazerman, M.H. The Inconsistent Evaluation of Comparative Payoffs in Labor Supply and Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 1996, $21 1-14.

Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., & Bazerman, M.H. Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the Role of Communication. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1996, 7, 111-126.

Diekmann, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., Shah, P.P., Schroth, H.A., & Bazerman, M.H. The Descriptive and Prescriptive Use of Previous Purchase Price in Negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1996, , 179-191.

Gibson, K., Thompson, L.L., & Bazerman, M.H. Shortcomings of Neutrality in Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality. Negotiation Journal 1996, 12, 69-80.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 7 of 19

Messick, D.M., & Bazerman, M.H Ethics for the 21st Century: A Decision Making Approach. SloanManagement Review 1996,37,9-22.

Reprinted in J.W. Dienhart (Ed.), Business, Institutions, and Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.

Reprinted in J.W. Dienhart, R. Duska, and D. Moberg (Eds.), The Next Phase of Business Ethics Integrating Psychology and Ethics JAI Press, 2001.

Keysar, B., (Ginzel, L., & Bazerman, M.H. States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Curse of Knowledge of Beliefs. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1995, 64, 283-293.

Mannix, E. A., Tinsley, C., & Bazerman, M.H. Negotiating Over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1995, 6-2, 241-25 1.

Bazerman, M.H., White, S.B., & Loewenstein, G.F. Perceptions of Fairness in Interpersonal and Individual Choice Situations. Current Directions in Psychological Science 1995, 4, 39-43.

Bazerman, M.H., Schroth, H.A., Shah, P.P., Diekmann, K.A., & Tenbrunsel, A.E. The Inconsistent Role of Comparison Others and Procedural Justice to Hypothetical Job Descriptions: Implications for Job Acceptance Decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1994, 60, 326-352.

White, S.B., Valley, K.L., Bazerman, M.H., Neale, MA., & Peck, S.R. Alternative Models of Price Behavior in Dyadic Negotiations: Market Prices, Reservation Prices and Negotiator Goals. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1994, 57, 430-447.

Bazerman, M.H., Neale, M.A., Valley, K.L., Kim, Y.M., & Zajac, E.J. The Effects of Agents and Mediators on Negotiation Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1992, 57, 55-73.

Reprinted in T. Connolly, H. Arkes and K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and Decision Making M Interdisciplinary Reader Cambridge University Press, 2″‘ edition, 1996, 3rd edition, 2000.

Bazerman, M.H., Loewenstein, G.F., & Whit; S.B. Reversals of Preference in Allocation Decisions: Judging an Alternative Versus Choosing Among Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 1992, 220-240.

Reprinted in L. Thompson (Ed.), The Social Psychology of Organizational Behavior Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2001.

Neale, M.A., & Bazerman, M.H. Negotiator Cognition and Rationality: A Behavioral Decision Theory Perspective. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1992, 51, 157-175.

Valley, K.L., White, S.B., Neale, MA., & Bazerman, M.H. Agents as Information Brokers: The Effects of Information Disclosure on Negotiated Outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1992, 51, 220-236.

Sondak, H., & Bazerman, M.H. Power Balance and the Rationality of Outcomes in Matching Markets. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1991, 50, 1-23.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Ball, S.B., Bazerman, M.H., & Carroll, J.S. An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Winner’s Curse. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1991, 48, 1-22.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

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Zajac, E.J., & Bazerman, M.H. Blind Spots in Strategic Decision Making: The Case of Competitor Analysis.

Academy of Management Review 1991,16,37-56.

.Farber, H.S., Neale, MA., & Bazerman, M.H. The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion on Dispute Outcomes. Industrial Relations 1990, , 361-384,

Kim, Y.M., Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, MA. The Role of Bargaining Zones and Agents: A Negotiation Simulation. Organizational Behavior Teaching Review 1990, 14, 53-63.

Murnighan, J.K., & Bazerman, M.H. A Perspective on Negotiation Research in Accounting and Auditing. The Accounting Review, 1990, 65, 642-651.

Weingart, L.R., Thompson, L.L., Bazerman, M.H., & Carroll, J.S. Tactical Behavior and Negotiation Outcomes. International Journal of Conflict Management 1990, .1, 7-32.

Loewenstein, G.F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, MR. Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 7, 426-441.

Reprinted in L. Thompson (Ed.), The Social Psychology of Organizational Behavior Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2001.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Mannix, E.A., Thompson, L.L., & Bazerman, M.H. Negotiation in Small Groups. Journal of Applied Psychology 1989,74, 508-517.

Farber, H.S., & Bazerman, M.H. Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1989, jj)4, 99-120.

Sondak, H., & Bazerman, M.H. Matching and Negotiation Processes in Quasi-Markets. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1989, 44, 261-280.

Bazerman, M.H., & Sondak, H. Judgmental Limitations in Diplomatic Negotiations. Negotiation Journal 1988, 4, 303-317.

Thompson, L., Mannix, E., & Bazerman, MR. Group Negotiation: Effects of Decision Rule, Agenda, and Aspiration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1988, 4, 86-95.

Carroll, J.S., Bazerman, M.H., & Maury, R. Negotiator Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators’ Understanding of their Opponents. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1988, 4.1.., 352-370.

Farber, H.S., & Bazerman, M.H. Why is there Disagreement in Bargaining? American Economic Review 1987,77, 347-352.

Reprinted in MR. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., Russ, L.E., & Yakura, B. Post-Settlement Settlements in Dyadic Negotiations: The Need for Renegotiation in Complex Environments. Negotiation Journal 1987, 3. 283-297.

Reprinted in J.W. Breslin & J.Z. Rubin (Eds.), Negotiation Theory and Practice Cambridge: Program on Negotiation, 1991.

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Neale, MA,, Bazerman, M.H., & Wilson, M. Progressive Approximation Final Offer Arbitration: Matching the Goals of a Conflict Domain. International Journal of Management 1987,4, 30-37.

McAlister, L., Bazerman, M.H., & Fader, P. Power and Goal Setting in Channel Negotiations. Journal of Marketing Research 1986,23,228-236.

Neat; M.A., Bazerman, M.H., Northcraft, GB., & Alperson, C. ‘Choice Shift” Effects in Group Decisions: A Decision Bias Perspective. International Journal of Small Group Research 1986,2,33-42.

Farber, H.S., & Bazerman, M.H. The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final Offer Arbitration. Econometrica 1986,54,1503-1528.

Neal; MA., NorthcrafI, GB., Magliozzi, T., & Bazerman, M.H. The Buyer-Seller Transaction: A Simulation of Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market Organizational Behavior Teaching Review, 1986, 10, 28-38.

Bazerman, M.H. Why Negotiations Go Wrong. Psychology Today June, 1986.

Reprinted in R.J. Lewicki, J.A. Litterer, D.M. Saunders, & J.W. Minton (Eds.), Negotiation Readings Exercises and Cases Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1993.

Bazerman, M.H., & Farber, H.S. Arbitrator Decision Making: When are Final Offers Important? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1985, 9., 76-89.

Bazerman, M.H., & Lewicki, R.J. Contemporary Research Directions in the Study of Negotiations in Organizations: A Selective Review. Journal of Occupational Behavior 1985, 6, 1-17.

Reprinted in D.R. Hampton, C.E. Summers, & WA. Webber (Eds.), Organizational Behavior ScottForesman and Company, 1986.

Bazerman, M.H., & Farber, H.S. Analyzing the Decision Making Processes of Arbitrators. Sloan Management Review 1985,27.3948.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed), Negotiation, Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H. Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1985, 38, 558-570.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Neale, MA., & Bazerman, M.H. Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation: Viewing Negotiation as a Judgmental Process. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1985, 29, 33-55.

Neale, MA., & Bazerman, M.H. The Effect of Externally Set Goals on Reaching Integrative Agreements in Competitive Markets. Journal of Occupational Behavior, 1985, 6, 19-32.

Neale, MA., & Bazerman, M.H. The Effect of Framing of Conflict and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behavior and Outcome. Academy of Management Journal 1985, 4 34-49.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., Magliozzi, T., & Neale, M.A. Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market Organization Behavior and Human Performance 1985, M. 294-313.

MaxH. Bazerman, Page lOofl9

Reprinted in L. Thompson (Ed.), The Social Psychology of Organizational Behavior Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2001.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H. The Relevance of Kahneman and Tversky’s Concept of Framing to Organizational Behavior. Journal of Management 1984, fl 333-343.

Bazerman, M.H., Giuliano, T., & Appelman, A. Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 1984, 33, 141-152.

Brockner, J., Nathanson, S., Friend, A., Harbeck, J,, Samuelson, C., Rouser, R., Bazerman, M.H., & Rubin, J. The Role of Modeling Processes in the “Knee Deep in the Big Muddy” Phenomenon. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 1984, a 77-99.

Bazerman, M.H. Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption. American Behavioral Scientist 1983, 27, 618-634.

Reprinted in J.W. Breslin & J.Z. Rubin (Eds.), Negotiation Theory and Practice Cambridge: Program on Negotiation, 1991.

Reprinted in M.L. Nelkin (Ed.), Understanding Negotiation Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 2001.

Bazerman, M.H., & Samuelson, W.F. I Won the Auction But Don’t Want the Prize. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1983,27,618-634.

Reprinted in MR. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management, Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., & Schoorrnan, F.D. A Limited Rationality Model of Interlocking Directorates: An Individual, Organizational, and Societal Decision. Academy of Management Review 1983, 8, 206-217.

Neale, M.A., & Bazerman, M.H. The Role of Perspective Taking Ability in Negotiating Under Different Forms of Arbitration. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1983, 36, 378-388.

Bazerman, M.H., Beekun, R.I., & Schoorman, F.D. Performance Evaluation in a Dynamic Context: Laboratory Study of the Impact of a Prior Commitment to the Rate. Journal of Applied Psychology 1982, 7, 873-876.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neal; M.A. Improving Negotiation Effectiveness Under Final Offer Arbitration: The Role of Selection and Training. Journal of Applied Psychology 1982, 67 543-548.

Bazerman, M.H. Impact of Personal Control on Performance: Is Added Control Always Beneficial? Journal of Applied Psychology, 1982, 67, 472479.

Schoorman, F.D., Bazerman, M.H., & Atkin, R.S. Interlocking Directorates: A Strategy for the Management of Environmental Uncertainty. Academy of Management Review 1981, 6, 243-251.

Schulz, R., & Bazerman, MR. Ceremonial Occasions and Mortality: Methodological and Conceptual Issues. American Psychologist 1980,35 253-261.

BOOK CHAPTERS

Neale, M.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., Galvin, T., & Bazerman, M.H. A Decision Perspective to Organizations: Social cognition, behavioral decision theory, and their links to organizational behavior. To appear in S. Clegg, C. Hardy,

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 11 of 19

W. Nord and T. Lawrence (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Studies Sage Publications, 2006.

Bazerman, M.H., Malhotra, D. Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays. In de Cremer, D., Murnighan, K., & Zeelenberg (Eds.), Social Psychology and Economics, in press.

Bazerman, M.H., & Shonk, K. The Decision Perspective to Negotiation. In B. Bordone & Michael Moflitt (Eds.), Handbook of Dispute Resolution SF: Jossey-Bass, in press.

Caruso, E.M., Epley, N., & Bazerman, M.H. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Perspective Taking in Groups. In Mannix, E., Neale, M.A., & Tenbrunsel, A.E. Research on Managing Groups and Teams Elsevier, in press.

Bazerman, M.H., & Chugh, D. Focusing in Negotiation. To appear in L. Thompson (Ed.), Frontiers of Social Psychology Negotiations Psychological Press, 2005.

Chugh, D, Bazerman, M.H., & Banaji, M.R. Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest. To appear in Moore, D., Cain, D., Loewenstein, G., & Bazerman, M.H (Eds.). Conflicts of Interest Problems and Solutions from Law Medicine and Organizational Settings London: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Moore, D., Loewenstein, G., Cain, D., & Bazerman, M.H. Introduction. To appear in Moore, D., Cain, D., Loewenstein, G., & Bazerman, M.H (Eds.). Conflicts of Interest Problems and Solutions from Law Medicine and Organizational Settings London: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H. A Decision Perspective on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution. In Bazerman, M.H. (Ed). Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Resolution Volume I Edward Elgar, Publishing, Ltd., 2004.

Bazerman, M.H., & Hoffman, A.J. Applying the Insights of Walton and McKersie to the Environmental Context. In T. Kockan, R. Locke, & D. Lipsky (Eds.), Negotiations and Change From the Workplace to Society Cornell University Press, 2003.

Troast, J., Hoffman, A., Riley, H., and Bazerman, M.H. Institutions as barriers and enablers to negotiated agreements: Institutional entrepreneurship and the Plum Creek Habitat Conservation Plan”. In A. Hoffman and M. Ventresca (eds.) (2001) Organizations Policy and the Natural Environment Institutional and Strategic Perspectives Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Baron, I., & Bazerman, M.H. Enlarging the pie by accepting small losses for large gains. In R. Gowda & J. Fox (Eds.), Judgments Decisions and Public Policy New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Bazerman, M.H., Curhan, J., Moore, D., Valley, K. Negotiations. In Annual Review of Psychology Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, Inc., 2000.

Bazerman, M.H., Curhan, J., & Moore, D. The Death and Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiations. In G. Fletcher and M. Clark (Eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology Interpersonal Processes 2000.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume I, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., & Hoffman, A.J. Environmental Destruction: Individual, Organizational, and Institutional Explanations. In R.I. Sutton and B.M. Staw (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior JAI Press, Volume XXI, 1999.

Kurtzberg, T., Moore, D., Valley, K., & Bazerman, M.H. Agents in Negotiation: Toward Testable Propositions. In R.H. Mnookin, L.E. Susskind, and P.C. Foster (Eds.), Negotiating on Behalf of Others Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1999.

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Max H. Bazerman, Page 12 of 19

Bazerman, MR. Rational Authority Allocation to an Agent. In R.H. Mnookin, L.E. Susskind., and P.C. Foster (Eds.), Negotiating on Behalf of Others Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1999.

Bazerman, M.H., Buisseret, C., & Wade-Benzoni, K.A. The Role of Judgment in Global Climate Change. In A. Hoffman (Ed.), Global Climate Change San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1998.

Diekmann, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., and Bazerman, M.H. Escalation and Negotiation: Two Central Themes in the Work of Jeffrey Z. Rubin. In D. Kolb (Ed.), Negotiation Eclectics: Essays in Memory of Jeffrey Z Rubin Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiation, 1999.

Diekmann, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., and Bazerman, M.H. Fairness, Justifiability, and Dispute Resolution. In S. Gleason (Ed.), Frontiers inDispute Resolution in Labor Relations and Human Resources East Lansing: MSU Press, 1997.

Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., & Bazerman, M.H. Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness as an Obstacle to Just Resolution of Conflict. In R. Lewicki, R. Bies & B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research in Negotiation in Organizations JAI Press, Volume 6, 1997.

Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Messick, D.M., & Bazerman, M.H. The Dysfunctional Effects of Standards on Environmental Attitudes and Choices. In M.H. Bazerman, D.M. Messick, A.E. Tenbrunsel, & K.A. Wade-Benzoni (Eds.), Psychological Perspectives to Environmental and Ethical Issues SF: New Lexington Books, 1997.

Tenbrunsel, A.E., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Messick, D.M., & Bazerman, M.H. The Psychology of Environmental Degradation. In M.H. Bazerman, D.M. Messick, A.E. Tenbrunsel, & K.A. Wade-Benzoni (Eds.), Psychological Perspectives to Environmental and Ethical Issues SF: New Lexington Books, 1997.

Hall, D.T., & Bazerman, MR. Organization Design and Job Characteristics. In J.L. Bess (Ed.), Teaching Well and Liking It Motivating Faculty to Teach Effectively, Johns Hopkins Press, 1991. This paper is a revision of the 1982 Hall and Bazerman paper.

Bazerman, M.H., Wade-Benzoni, K.A., & Benzoni, F. A Behavioral Decision Theory Perspective to Environmental Decision Making. In D.M. Messick and A. Tenbrunsel (Eds.), Ethical Issues in Managerial Decision Maldng NewYork: Russell Sag; 1996.

Wade-Benzoni, K.A., Tenbrunsel, A.E., & Bazerman, M.H. Shark Harvesting and Resource Conservation. In A.R.

Beckenstein, F.J. Long, M.H. Arnold, and T.N. Gladwin (Eds.), Stakeholder Negotiations Exercises in Sustainable Development Chicago: Irwin, 1996.

Tenbrunsel, A.E., Galvin, T.L., Neale, M.A., and Bazerman, M.H. Cognitions in Organizations. S. Clogg, C. Hardy, and W. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Studies Sage Publications, 1996.

Reprinted in S. Clegg, C. Hardy, and W. Nord (Eds.), Managing Organizations Current Issues Sage Publications, 1999.

Bazerman, M.H., Gibbons, R.S., Thompson, L.L., & Valley, K.L. When and Why Do Negotiators Outperform Game Theory? In J.H. Halpern & R.N. Stem (Eds.), Debating Rationality Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making ILR Press, 1996.

Reprinted in A. Rau, E. Sherman, & S. Peppet (Eds.), Processes of Dispute Resolution Foundation Press, 2002.

Harrison, J.R., & Bazerman, M.H. Regression to the Mean, Expectation Inflation, and the Winner’s Curse in Organizational Contexts. Ink. Kramer and D.M. Messick (Eds.), Negotiation as a Social Process 1995.

White, S.B., Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. Alternative Models of Negotiated Outcomes and the Nontraditional Mar H. Bazerman, Page 13 of 19

Utility Concerns that Limit their Predictability. In R. Bies, R. Lewicki, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research in Negotiation in Organizations JAI Press, Volume 5, 1995.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. The Role of Fairness Considerations and Relationships in a Judgment Perspective of Negotiation. In IC. Arrow, R. Mnookin, L. Ross, A. Tversky, and R. Wilson (Eds.), Barriers to Conflict Resolution Norton, 1995.

Gibson, K., Thompson, L.L., & Bazerman, M.H. Biases and Rationality in the Mediation Process. In L. Heath, F.

Bryant, J. Edwards, B. Henderson, J. Myers, B. Posavac, Y. Suarez-Balcazar, and R.S. Tindale (Eds.), Allocations of Heuristics and Biases to Social Issues Volume III of Social Psychological Applications to Social issues, New York: Plenum, 1994.

Bazerman, M.H. Fairness, Social Comparison, and Irrationality. In J.K. Murnighan (Ed.), Social Psychology in Organizations Advances inTheory and Research Prentice Hall, 1993.

Bazerman, M.H. & Neale, M.A. Negotiation Rationality and Negotiation Cognition: The Interactive Roles of Prescriptive and Descriptive Research. In P. Young (Ed.), Negotiation Analysis University of Michigan Press, 1991.

Bazerman, M.H., Mannix, E., Sondak, H., & Thompson, L.L. Negotiator Behavior and Decision Processes in Dyads, Groups, and Markets. In J.S. Carroll (Ed.), Applied Social Psychology and Organizational Settings Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989.

Neale, M.A., Northcraft, G., & Bazerman, M.H. Cognitive Aspects of Negotiation: New Perspectives in Dyadic Decision Making. In M.A. Rahim (Ed.), Managing Conflict An Interdisciplinary Approach New York: Praeger, Inc., 1989.

Bazerman, M.H., Mannix, E., & Thompson, L. Groups as Mixed-Motive Negotiations. In E.J. Lawler and B. Markovsky (Eds.), Advances inGroup Processes: Theory and Research Volume V, JAI Press, 1988.

Bazerman, M.H., & Carroll, J.S. Negotiator Cognition. In B.M. Staw and L.L. Cunirnings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, JAI Press, Volume IX, 1987.

Reprinted in L.L. Cummings & B.M. Staw (Ed.), Information and Cognition in Organizations JAI Press, 1990.

Kochan, T.A., & Bazerman, M.H. Macro Determinants of the Future of the Study of Negotiations in Organizations. In Research in Negotiation in Organizations JAI Press, Volume I, 1986, edited by R.J. Lewicki, B.H. Sheppard, and M.H. Bazerman.

Sinus, D.B., & Bazerman, M.H. New Techniques and Cognitions for Effective Dispute Resolution. In J.D. Nyhart (Ed.), Coastal Zone and Continental Shelf Conflict Resolution MIT Sea Grant College Program, 1985.

Lewicki, R.J., & Bazerman, M.H. Studying Organizational Negotiations: Implications for Future Research. In M.H. Bazerman and R.J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating inOrganizations, Sage Publications, Inc., 1983.

Bazerman, M.H., & Neale, M.A. Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution. In M.H. Bazerman and R.J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in Organizations Sage Publications, Inc., 1983.

Reprinted in H. Arkes and K. Hammond (Eds.), Introduction to Judgment and Decision Making An Interdisciplinary Reader Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Samuelson, W.F., & Bazerman, M.H. Negotiating Under the Winner’s Curse. In V. Smith (Ed.), Research in Experimental Economics JAI Press, Volume III, 1985.

Reprinted in M.H. Bazerman (Ed.), Negotiation Decision Making and Conflict Management Volume 2,

**———————————————————

Max H. Bazerman, Page 14 of 19

Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Bazerman, M.H., & Graham-Moore, B.E. Productivity Gainsharing Formulas: Developing a Reward Structure to Optimally Achieve Organizational Goals. In B.E. Graham-Moore and T. Ross (Eds.), Productivity Gainsharirig Spectrum, Inc., 1983.

Hall, D.T., & Bazerman, M.H., Organization Design and Faculty Motivation to Teach. In J.L. Bess (Ed.), New Directions for Teaching and Learning Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1982.

Goodman, P.S., Bazerman, M.H., & Conlon, E.J. Institutionalized Processes in Organizational Change. In Research in Organizational Behavior J

9 Responses to “EXPERT REPORT OF MAX H. BAZERMAN, Ph.D.”

  1. krueger Says:

    “as long as executives and managers are rewarded for increasing market share and for increasing profit…the same conduct…will continue.”

    Exactly. As the CEO of tobacco giant Philip Morris says, it has “a single overriding objective”: making money.

    www.altria.com/download/pdf/Investors_LCRemaks_MorganStanley4Nov04.pdf

    A single, overriding objective.

    At Philip Morris, people’s lives don’t come first, they don’t come second, they don’t count at all.

    Philip Morris has a single objective: making money. It will override all other objectives to make money.

  2. anti-krueger Says:

    Lighten up, Francis. Altria is a publicly held company whose shareholders expect profits. And, if profits are its only objective, then how do you explain all the time, money, and resources the company has dedicated over the last 50 years to develop less hazardous cigarettes (at the urging of and in cooperation with the public health community and the U.S. government)?

  3. tobacco observer Says:

    “as long as executives and managers are rewarded for increasing market share and for increasing profit…the same conduct…will continue.”

    Exactly. As the CEO of tobacco giant Philip Morris says, it has “a single overriding objective”: making money.
    ******

    Amazing! Go figure, a publically owned cigarette company, and American DOW component that sells a highly regulated, highly taxed, legal product to consenting adults is in the business of “making money”? Who ever would have thunk it?

    And the NERVE of that company to actually “pay” its executives when they do a good job for the shareholders! How DARE THEY!

    I can’t wait to see this Harvard prof. Bazerman get up on the stand and explain the differences between the corporate structures of Philip Morris, et al, and every other corporation in the United States and elsewhere in the world! I’d love to hear his “opinion” on what is so unique to the corporate structure of Philip Morris, et al, that compels them to commit RICO violations!

    The fact remains that without disgorgement or other retrospective remedies, the gov’t has got just about ZERO left they can ask for, so no wonder they are grasping at straws here!

  4. krueger Says:

    Making money is great when (as with every other product in America) your product, used as intended, doesn’t kill your customer.

    But when your product, used exactly as intended, kills your customer, sickens and maims and kills millions of customers, yes, there is a conflict between making money and doing the right thing. Fortunately for Philip Morris, this has been no painful conflict for it. It has chosen, always, and with no hesitation, to make money. It has put its profits above lives.

    Philip Morris, like the rest of the tobacco industry, has a single, overriding objective. Overriding. It makes money at the expense of people’s health, automony, dignity, independence, and lives. That is the only way it makes money. That’s what its product does.

    And that, in a nutshell, is why it’s not a great thing tobacco executives get paid well. They’re getting paid to addict 14 year olds to slow poison. That’s the business Philip Morris is in, and that’s what they get paid to make happen. They do it very well.

  5. df Says:

    Aw, krueger, everyone’s a winner here except the smokers and taxpayers. Max Bazerman’s making $800 an hour testifying, and who knows how much the lawyers are making.

    The real issue is that the federal government makes a mockery of science by denying that nicotine is a drug that should be regulated by the fda. I wonder why Bazerman doesn’t have the guts to say this? Maybe he likes the status quo where he gets paid $800/hour in the endless litigation?

    By the way, I loved how Bazerman only listed male researchers - Paul Slovic (Decision Research), Baruch Fischhoff (CMU), George Loewenstein (CMU), Mahzarin Banaji (Harvard), Sendhil Mullainathan (Harvard), David Laibson (Harvard), Mall Rabin (Berkeley), Eldar Shafir (Princeton), Cohn Camerer (Cal Tech), Richard Thaler (University of Chicago), Cass Sunstein (University of Chicago), and others.

    Boys will cite boys.

  6. tobacco observer Says:

    And that, in a nutshell, is why it’s not a great thing tobacco executives get paid well. They’re getting paid to addict 14 year olds to slow poison. That’s the business Philip Morris is in, and that’s what they get paid to make happen. They do it very well.
    ***

    What a bunch of alarmist crap. 85% tax, a complete ban on electronic advertising, a complete ban on billboard advertising, no tobacco related merchandise, no health claims, FTC oversight. . .these restrictions aren’t enough? Why don’t you just come right out and say you want smoking to be illegal?

    That’s certainly what you want, no? You’re already all but saying you don’t believe cigarettes should be sold. . .not by Philip Morris, not by anyone (and heaven forbid anyone make money by selling them!). Let’s bring back the tobacco prohibition from the turn of the century! Adults can’t be trusted to make their own decisions, right?

    Meanwhile nobody is forcing people to smoke, nor preventing people from quitting. Not Philip Morris, nor anyone else. The sale of cigarettes to minors is already illegal, and has been for decades, and allegations of marketing to minors have comprised the WORST part of the gov’t case. Six months into the trial, and we have yet to see a single ad puported to specifically target minors. (Hint to DOJ prosecution. . .by their very nature you can’t hide large public marketing campaigns. . .where’s the beef?).

    Slow poison? Living is slow poision! Last time I checked human mortality was 100%. All smokers die. . .all non-smokers die. Its disingenuous to say that Philip Morris *wants* its customers to die. Of course they don’t. . .at the very least that’s bad for business! Do you really think that if Philip Morris had a safer cigarette they wouldn’t sell it? The real shame is that the same ones who are trying to ban cigarettes simultaneously block every effort by the tobacco companies to market a safer cigarette. “No such thing as a safe cigarette” they scream!

  7. David Gundersen Says:

    Tobacco Observer, if you need a loaf of bread to live, and you’re given a half loaf, you’re going to die. The industry will continue to hope they can offer half a loaf, claim credit for the half, and hope nobody notices that they’re still killing too many people in the name of profits.

    The full loaf is clear. Smoking should be legal but sold in outlets and/or pharmacies. Tobacco shouldn’t be advertised anywhere. Warning labels should be large and powerful. Taxes should be used to keep that price point between preventing initiation/promoting quitting and creating a black market. Aggressive prevention programs (education, media, clean indoor air policy) and free access to cessation support should be run by every state. As for money, money will always be made on an addictive product, so let them make their money. However, let’s limit the human and economic impact so taxpayers and insurance premiums don’t continue to subsidize the industry’s profits. Anything less lets industry profit from a deadly product without maximum public protections.

    As for advertising, there’s a reason Philip Morris supports FDA regulation and the likely increased limits on advertising that would follow. Philip Morris in particular, and all the other companies don’t need to advertise cigarettes any more since the tens of billions already spent have made smoking part of our social fabric. Smoking is rebellion. Smoking is individualism. Smoking is sensuality. To youth, smoking is instant maturity and adulthood.

    If the industry put two years of its current $12 billion marketing budget into the flashiest, most powerful anti-tobacco and clean indoor ads they could muster with their collective marketing genius, they could denormalize and deglamorize tobacco overnight. Instead they spend prevention pennies on the promotion dollar to make boring, soft-sell, corporate image ads with pictures of middle class ex-smokers and flashes of website pages (low income people - who smoke at higher rates and really need the support - don’t relate and don’t have great internet access and the industry knows it. The industry’s interested in juries and voters).

    The reality is that the industry doesn’t “want” their clients to die, but they don’t care if they do as long as they can maintain replacement levels. All the remedies outlined in the case affect their replacement capacity. Safer cigarettes are another half loaf strategy that won’t sell to anybody but juries and voters. The product is doomed to failure from the start - being safe and healthy is not the smoker profile. They simply don’t care who dies.

    All in all, you might be right that the DOJ is in trouble with this case, but your non-legal commentaries are quite specious. It’s only a matter of time before the mounting science and costs (human and health care) overwhelm your rhetoric. It might take another decade or two, but it’ll happen in my lifetime.

  8. krueger Says:

    “85% tax, a complete ban on electronic advertising, a complete ban on billboard advertising, no tobacco related merchandise, no health claims, FTC oversight . . .these restrictions aren’t enough?”

    Oh, those heavy restrictions. Poor, poor Big Tobacco. I had no idea it was so hard to be in the tobacco industry.

    OK. Let’s take those in order.

    Tax: the tax hasn’t changed Big Tobacco’s profitability:

    http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=MO&annual

    Nor has the tax slowed down Big Tobacco’s predatory behavior.

    The tax may help save teens from getting addicted. Then again, maybe not: Big Tobacco works to keep cigarettes available to teens for free:

    http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/514348983-9015.html

    Ban on elecronic advertising: where have you been living? Do they watch TV there?

    Cigarette ads are broadcast regularly on TV. They’re just not called ads; they’re called product placement, or sports sponsorships. Those are two ways this industry gets around the broadcast ban.

    An internal tobacco industry memo boasts of its cigarette product placement on TV shows: “we have been able to encourage the use of cigarettes in . . . Vega$, Hart to Hart, Fantasy Island, Falmingo Road, and other such programs . . . providing exposure to cigarette smoking in attractive, relaxed settings.”

    http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/egx62d00

    Then there’s cigarette product placement in movies. Which puts cigarettes ads on the air every day. Every time Saturday Night Fever or Superman II airs on TV, cable, or satellite, a Marlboro TV commercial is running:

    http://www.realitycheckny.com/RC_links/ProductPlacement.htm

    http://www.quit.org.au/quit/FandI/fandi/c15s7.htm

    http://www.saclung.org/tobacco%20control%20article.pdf

    http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bca72d00

    http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/268413.html

    http://www.mediascope.org/pubs/ibriefs/tpm.htm

    Auto racing may be an even more effective way this industry gets around the broadcast ban. In just one car race sponsored by Marlboro, the Marlboro brand name or logo was displayed 5,933 times, was onscreen for 46 of the 94 minutes of broadcast time.

    Alan Blum, “The Marlboro Grand Prix: Circumvention of the Television Ban on Tobacco Advertising,” New England Journal of Medicine, March 28, 1991.

    In 1994, Philip Morris and RJR received nearly $40 million in free TV time from their auto racing sponsorships alone.

    Advertising Age, June 12, 1995.

    This industry is very good at getting around advertising restrictions. With such tactics as product placement and sports sponsorships, it’s circumvented the broadcast ban for 30 years. The “complete ban on electronic advertising” doesn’t exist.

    Which is not even mentioning industry image ads that are running right now. Pushing Big Tobacco’s PR and shining up its image, they just push the company instead of the product. It’s tobacco advertising that shines the brand without even mentioning a product brand name. The company is the brand, it’s pushed on TV, and it’s another hole in the broadcast ban.

    Oh, those heavy, painful restrictions. Poor Big Tobacco.

    Ban on billboard advertising: again, where do you live? Do they have convenience stores there? Gas stations? Point of sale ads? That’s tobacco’s newest billboards.

    At some stores you can’t see the glass,
    they’re so thick.

    It’s another tactic Big Tobacco uses to get around advertising restrictions:

    http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/11/suppl_2/ii47

    http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/Script/DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=289

    In the USA, Big Tobacco spent over $11 billion in 2001 pushing its lethal product. $9 billion of that went into tobacco’s newest billboards: advertising in and around convenience stores.

    My local ARCO has large poster sized cigarette ads on the store, in the store, on the pumps, on signs by the road, on poles on the corner of the lot. Then tops it off with a huge display of product and ad in the front by the cashier.

    These ads are effective. They get to Big Tobacco’s most important audience: children:

    http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/extract/13/3/209

    http://health.yahoo.com/news/46306

    Poor, poor, Big Tobacco. All those restrictions.

    Tobacco related merchandise shows us yet another way Big Tobacco does an end run around restrictions. The tobacco industry still does its Marlboro Miles promotions, and Marlboro Gear, and Camel Cash, and so on and on. So, what about those MSA restrictions? The trinkets carry no explicit brand name or logo — but through colors, packaging, and design, the trinkets push cigarette brand images and messages.

    Some examples:

    http://www.trinketsandtrash.org/msa/dmstrategy4.htm

    No health claims? What planet did you say you were from? On this planet, cigarettes are sold and promoted every day with filters, “light” and “ultra-light” labels, and recently, “reduced risk” promises.

    As the tobacco industry said in its internal memos, these were “an effective advertising gimmick” that sold “the image of health reassurance.” Researchers agree: “over the past 50 years advertisements of filtered and low tar cigarettes were intended to reassure the many smokers who were anxious about the health risk of smoking.”

    http://www.cancerpage.com/news/article.asp?id=4039

    What’s that, the ads don’t say “healthier” in so many words? You’re right: the carefully written copy seldom promises anything in so many words. But of course the ads are clear enough in what they do promise. The name, the label, the image, the numbers, the context; the message is conveyed. The ad is beautifully constructed to make the claim without making it in so many words.

    “You can switch down to lower tar and still get satisfying taste” and so on. “Merit” and similar names.

    In a particularly revealing instance, Silk Cut Ultras were heavily advertised prior to New Year 1999 using the slogan “JAN ONE - What better time to move to 1 mg”. The ‘ONE’ refers to the 1 mg tar measured in the Silk Cut Ultra - which has been the theme of a campaign using several slogans involving ‘ONE’. The ‘JAN ONE’ ad was clearly intended to suggest that switching to Silk Cut Ultra was a worthy New Year’s resolution - effectively an unfounded health claim.

    What’s that? “Light” isn’t a health claim? That’s what the tobacco industry likes to say. And yet Philip Morris’s Kraft General Foods markets a range of products using the word “Light” to indicate healthier, such as this ‘light’ peanut butter “for health nuts”:

    http://tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/supersite/resources/docs/industry_advertising.htm

    http://www.ash.org.uk/html/regulation/html/big-one.html

    Poor, poor, poor Big Tobacco. It can’t make health claims. Unless it implies them. Which it finds is as effective as making explicit claims:

    http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12573176

    Big Tobacco is still making health claims, and in much the same way: carefully worded claims that lead the reader or viewer to believe something has been promised, when it hasn’t been in so many words:

    http://www.wkyc.com/health/health_fullstory.asp?id=27393

    And then there’s the heavy burden of FTC oversight. How heavy is this:

    “Tobacco has been exempted from every major federal health and safety law enacted, by Congress including the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Fair Labeling and Packaging Act, the Toxic Substances Act, and the Hazardous Substances Act…Tobacco is the least regulated consumer product in the U.S.” Tobacco Use: An American Crisis, p. 53 and Washington Monthly, September 1993, p. 22

    http://new.globalink.org/tobacco/trg/Chapter32/Chapter32POLITICSPage16.html

    “The irony is that many of the poisons found in cigarette smoke are subject to strict regulation by federal laws which, on the other hand, specifically exempt tobacco products.” K. H. Ginzel, M.D, “What’s in a
    Cigarette”, ACSH, October 1, 1990.

    http://www.acsh.org/healthissues/newsID.832/healthissue_detail.asp

    The fact is, a pack of cigarettes is less regulated than a box of macaroni and cheese.

    “Are cigarettes just another legal product? No, compared to the legal treatment given other products, cigarettes are supralegal — they are a product that is above the law.”

    http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.204/news_detail.asp

    Gosh, poor Big Tobacco. It must be hell to be above the law.

  9. krueger Says:

    “The reality is that the industry doesn’t ‘want’ their clients to die, but they don’t care if they do as long as they can maintain replacement levels.”

    Exactly. Many would characterize Big Tobacco as immoral, but I’d say a more accurate word would be “amoral”. This industry doesn’t want its customer to die, but it has no objection to that happening.

    This industry knows that as a completely predictable result of its massive promotion and sophisticated engineering of tobacco product, millions of people will get addicted and get sick and die. This industry has never hesitated to arrange for that result to happen. It doesn’t aim at that result — it aims at making money. It just doesn’t care that as a result, millions will die. It has never placed a value on human life that would cause it to do anything differently.

    “Amoral” is something you think of how a machine works. That fits here. This industry has operated like a machine with a single, overriding objective: making money.

    If the product weren’t inherently lethal, this might just be a story of corporate greed, another Enron, shamelessly lying to people to make money. Merely that.

    With tobacco the story is about millions of lives snuffed out in the process. It’s about a product that kills 1 out of 5 Americans today. Kills that many precisely because it has been so effectively marketed and engineered for addiction.

    Does Big Tobacco want to kill 1 out of 5 Americans? No, but it has no problem with that if it can make money that way. That’s amoral.

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